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1 Introduction 
Capital budgeting or investment decisions have an essential influence on companies’ long-
term performance.1 They are fundamentally based on projections / assumptions on market 
developments and other factors, on which the decision makers only have limited direct con-
trol. Instead of a rational choice, capital budgeting might even be regarded as a process of 
reality construction.2 Research suggests that decision makers have only limited control over 
their own perception biases in this construction process.3 Post-completion auditing of capital 
investments is reported to be common in large companies and to serve mainly organizational 
learning purposes.4 Its mere existence, however, might be interpreted as the response to a re-
curring number of unsatisfactory decision results.  
Behavioral research focuses on how individuals make decisions and influence other individu-
als.5 One particular form of this research area consists of studying systematic biases in deci-
sion making,6 developing links between decision making, cognitive science and management 
/ finance / accounting7 and depicting heuristics presented under the titles of behavioral ac-
counting or finance.8 
It is in this perspective that this paper intends to answer the following research question: What 
are behavioral determinants for a successful capital-budgeting decision process?  
In order to answer the research question capital budgeting will be defined against the back-
drop of the body of literature of behavioral accounting and behavioral finance. For reasons of 
analysis, the capital budgeting process is divided into five different stages, for which insights 
from behavioral corporate finance and implications on budgeting from the behavioral ac-
counting view will be synthesized. Consequently, the authors identify and discuss three be-
havioral success factors (reflective prudence, critical communication and outcome independ-
ence) for the five stages of the capital budgeting process.  
                                                 
1  Cf. Eggers, J. (2012). 
2  Cf. Morgan, G. (1988). 
3  Cf. Russo, E. / Schoemaker, P. (1992), p. 8-10. 
4  Cf. Huikku, J. (2008), p. 140. 
5  Cf. Birnberg, J. / Ganguly A. (2012), p. 1. 
6  Cf. Kahneman, D. / Tversky, A. (1973).  
7  Cf. Peters, J. (1993). 
8  Cf. Lingnau, V. (2004), p. 731 for a German Management Accounting («Controlling ») concept informed by 
cognitive sciences; cf. Gerling, P. (2007) and Lingnau, V.  / Walter, K. (2011) for a German perception on 
psychological paradigms in German Management Accounting research.  
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2 Definition of Key Terms in the Literature 
2.1 The Behavioral Finance and Behavioral Accounting Research 
Areas 
Two main schools of thought influence the area of behavioral capital budgeting: behavioral 
finance and behavioral accounting, since capital budgeting is part of both, accounting and 
finance (corporate finance) areas as illustrated in figure 1. 
Figure 1: Capital budgeting as intersection of finance and accounting 
Behavioral finance examines the influence of psychology on financial decision making of 
human beings in households (individuals), markets (investors), and organizations (manag-
ers).9 A part of it, behavioral corporate finance, researches irrational investors and especially, 
irrational managers.10  
In opposite to modern (or neoclassical) finance prevailing since the 1950s, behavioral finance 
does not assume actors to be “100% rational 100% of the time”,11 neither in developing be-
liefs nor in decision making.12 Moreover, it does not expect markets to be efficient.13 Instead, 
it assigns importance to the institutional environment ignored by neoclassical finance and 
recognizes that decisions are biased by cognitive, emotional, and social factors. The findings 
                                                 
9  Cf. De Bondt, W. et al., S. (2008), p. 8. 
10  Cf. Baker, M. / Ruback, R. / Wurgler, J. (2007), pp. 147 et sq. 
11  Cf. Brealey, R. A. / Myers, S.C. / Allen, F.(2011), p. 355. 
12  Cf. Baker, M. / Ruback, R. / Wurgler, J. (2007), p. 168. 
13  Cf. Shefrin, H. (2009), p. 158. 
        Accounting Managerial 
Accounting 
Finance Corporate  
Finance 
 Capital 
Budgeting 
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of this area can be organized accordingly into three classes: personal (catalogue of biases), 
market (speculative dynamics of asset pricing) and organizational (effects of decision process 
on decision outcome). Furthermore, behavioral finance has three main building blocks: senti-
ment / beliefs, behavioral preferences, and limited arbitrage.14  
Before the term “behavioral finance” was defined as such, some (mis-)behavioral aspects 
have been incorporated in modern finance to a certain extent through the notion of the agency 
problem where the egoistic benefit seeking goals of agents (managers) conflict with the bene-
fit seeking of the principals (shareholders).15 Obviously, agency problem is a behavioral one 
since managers cognitively value their personal well-being over that of shareholders.  
However, corporate finance research was affected by behavioral science only in the middle of 
the 20th century16 and it was not until the late 1970s that scientists in finance and psychology 
started collaborative research.17 By that time, the development produced extensive debate,18 
most probably because it provided evidence for market inefficiency, thus shaking the, until 
then, fundamental pillar of finance.  
The second stream of research considered is behavioral (managerial) accounting since it is 
concerned with analysis, planning, and budgeting processes.19 Consequently, most of the ini-
tial research addressed budgetary slack. Budgetary slack “involves deliberate distortion of 
input information”, mostly to adjust payoffs towards own profit through understating of sales 
and revenues and overstating of cost.20  
The research on human problems with budgets and resulting budgetary slack has already 
started in the 1950s.21 As a conclusion Argyris arrived at the following statement: 
 “Our findings indicate that, first of all, more instruction in human relations need 
to be given to students of cost accounting and budgeting at the college level”.22 
Management accountants and academics seem to have recognized the importance of behavior 
in their profession,23 especially concerning the budget, because of the latter’s duality as a 
                                                 
14  Cf. De Bondt, W. et al. (2008), pp. 8 et sq. 
15  Cf. Brealey, R. / Myers, S. / Allen, F. (2011), p. 319. 
16  Cf. Gervais, S. (2010), p. 3. 
17  Cf. De Bondt, W. et al. (2008), p. 7. 
18  Cf. Thaler, R. (1999), p. 12. 
19  Cf. Hofstedt, T. (1976); San Miguel, J. (1977); Colville, I. (1981). 
20  Cf. Belkaoui, A. (1985), pp. 112 et sq. 
21  Cf. Argyris, C. (1953). 
22  Cf. Argyris, C. (1953), p. 109. 
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planning and control instrument which can be abused by the very same who are supposed to 
be controlled on its basis.24  
Budgetary slack can arise in every kind of organization no matter what the structure.25 The 
factors influencing the building of budgetary slack are among others self-esteem, low self-
esteem leading to more slack; design of compensation schemes, those mainly based on budget 
motivating managers to incorporate more slack; and attitude of top managers towards slack, 
the toleration of reasonable levels of which leads to less slack, higher effort, and a higher cor-
porate performance as argued among others by Bart26 and Schatzberg and Stevens.27 André et 
al.28 provide contradicting evidence for capital budgeting stating that the more delegation of 
authority and the less control by the top management exist the higher the slack (i.e. higher 
investment expenditures) tends to be, especially in the beginning of project implementation. 
Capital budgeting tends to be behaviorally influenced rather in the way of behavioral finance, 
with behavioral problems in accounting being quite contrary: In capital budgeting, forecast 
biases lead to cost incurred being “more than double the initial estimates”29 whereas in budg-
eting, costs tend to be over- and sales underestimated since the budget often serves as the ba-
sis for management compensation schemes.30 However, psychological insights from the area 
of budgeting should not be ignored but instead carefully employed, where applicable, to the 
capital budgeting process. Encouraged by previous research,31 the authors synthesize the in-
sights of the mentioned areas in order to learn about behavioral success factors in capital 
budgeting hence being able to provide concerned practitioners with practical recommenda-
tions. 
2.2 Capital Budgeting and the Capital Budgeting Process  
Capital budgeting shall be defined as “the process in which a business determines whether 
projects... are worth pursuing”.32 Therefore, in a first step, a project’s future expected cash 
                                                                                                                                                        
23  Cf. Zünd, A. (1977), p. 4 or Gerling, P. (2007), pp. 1-3. 
24  Cf. Beddington, R. (1969), p. 54; Belkaoui, A. (1985), p. 112. 
25  Cf. Belkaoui, A. (1985), pp. 112 et sq. 
26  Cf. Bart, C. (1988), pp. 289 et sq. 
27  Cf. Schatzberg, / Stevens, (2008), pp. 78 et sq.  
28  Cf. André, J. / Bruggen, A. / Moers, F. (2011), p. 23. 
29  Cf. Baker, M. / Ruback, R. / Wurgler, J. (2007), p. 172. 
30  Cf. Walker, K. B. / Johnson, E. N. (1999), p. 24 et sq. 
31  Cf. Gervais, S. (2010), p. 3. 
32  Cf. Brealey, R. / Myers, S. / Allen, F. (2011), p. 269. 
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inflows and outflows are estimated. Afterwards, they are examined to see whether the project 
will create value after cost expenditure above a certain benchmark. That is important because 
only such projects should be pursued. However, around 70% of firms accept investment pro-
posals not meeting the required hurdle rate, e.g. for strategic considerations33 or legal con-
straints. 
The purpose of capital budgeting is to identify all value adding investment opportunities such 
as mergers and acquisitions, or real investment, and, due to capital constraints from the mar-
ket or top management, to choose those adding the highest value.34 These projects are then 
listed in an annual capital budget which must also reflect the strategic goals of a company 
since most capital budgeting decisions affect a company in the long run.35  
There is no universal view on the stages of the capital budgeting process. Some researchers 
define three stages while others call for up to five stages.36 However, most authors generally 
identify the same critical phases but separate them slightly differently. Thus, in the following, 
a five-stage approach will be used with stages identified by the authors as identification and 
filtering; selection; authorization; implementation; and control, cf. figure 2. 
Figure 2: Overview of the stage of the corporate capital budgeting process 
To make a small  interdisciplinary digression, the authors would like to hint at a potential 
comparison between the defined capital budgeting process and the problem solving process of 
                                                 
33  Cf. Kalyebara, B. /  Ahmed, A. (2011), p. 69. 
34  Cf. Pike, R. (1983), p. 663. 
35  Cf. Brealey, R. / Myers, S. / Allen, F. (2011), p. 269. 
36  Cf. Burns, R. / Walker, J. (2009); Ducai, M. (2009); Kalyebara, B. / Ahmed, A. (2011). 
Identification & Filtering  Rough filtering for strategy, hurdle rate, risk, feasibility  
Selection Details: cash flow, risk, capital, staff, implementation; Instruments: mostly NPV, IRR, payback period 
Authorization Capital rationing & targets;  Ranking (strategy, return, risk)  
Implementation Implementation plan set-up: responsibilities, milestones, expenditure ceilings, meetings 
Performance Measurement & Control Before and after start, during implementation, after imple-mentation (post-audit) 
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cognitive psychologists: The 5 stage capital budgeting process interestingly resembles the 7 
stage problem solving process as defined by cognitive psychology, cf. figure 3.37  
 
Figure 3: The 7 stage problem solving process in cognitive psychology38 
Therefore, the whole capital budgeting process might be interpreted as problem solving pro-
cess and analyzed from a psychological paradigm.39 However, since the expected reader of 
this paper is more familiar with the capital budgeting vocabulary, the following discussion 
will be framed around the 5 stage capital budgeting process as depicted by finance and ac-
counting theory. 
   
  
                                                 
37  Cf. Pretz, J./Naples, A. / Sternberg, R. (2003), p. 3. 
38  Source: based on Pretz, J. / Naples, A. / Sternberg, R. (2003), pp. 3 et sq.  
39  Cf. Gerling, P. (2007), pp. 204-219 for an example of how cost accounting can be interpreted under the prob-
lem solving process paradigm.  
Evaluate the solution for accuracy 
Monitor his or her progress toward the goal 
Allocate mental and physical resources for solving the problem 
Organize his or her knowledge about the problem 
Develop a solution strategy 
Define and represent the problem mentally 
Recognize or identify the problem 
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Stage 1: Identification and filtering of investment proposals 
This stage is seen by many practitioners as the most critical one.40 Project ideas can be devel-
oped in two ways: first, ideas can emerge bottom-up or top-down and, second, they can be 
driven by an opportunity or by a need for an investment.  
The bottom-up investment ideas mirror the opportunities discovered by operations managers. 
Thereby, middle management cannot be expected to suggest strategic proposals.41 Instead, 
such ideas for strategic investments with high value will rather come from senior management 
having an overview of the company and its development. Furthermore, investments need to 
be made e.g. for replacement or expansions to new markets. Both investment opportunities 
and needs can originate both ways, top-down or bottom-up (cf. table 1).  
 Opportunities Needs 
Top-down 
Low motorization rate and growing gross do-
mestic product per capita in India 
Securing market share in a growing market 
Bottom-up 
Purchasing a bankrupt supplier’s  
Premises 
New conveyor belts due to  
obsolescence of the present ones 
Table 1: Fictitious examples of investment proposals of an automotive manufacturer 
After the identification of proposals these undergo a preliminary screening and filtering 
among others for inconsistencies with strategic goals (if originated bottom-up), inadequate 
hurdle rate, risk levels, and feasibility. Here, the data-gathering efforts of the company are 
crucial i.e. whether accounting or cash-flow methods are used, the state of the decision sup-
port system42 as well as how senior management deals with forecast bias.  
Stage 2: Selection  
In this stage, survived proposals are thoroughly examined including projection of cash flows 
(which is perceived as the most difficult part), risk, demand for, and cost of capital, timing of 
investments, personnel involved, and a first implementation plan.43 As a result, the best pro-
jects are selected and forwarded to top management for approval and authorization.  
The mostly used algorithms for evaluation are the net present value, followed by internal rate 
of return and payback period, weighted average cost of capital for determination of the cost of 
                                                 
40  Cf. Kalyebara, B. / Ahmed, A. (2011), p. 67. 
41  Cf. Brealey, R. / Myers, S. / Allen, F. (2011), p. 269. 
42  Cf. Burns, R. / Walker, J. (2009), p. 83. 
43  Cf. Burns, R. / Walker, J. (2009), p. 83; Kalyebara, B. / Ahmed, A. (2011), p. 60. 
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capital or hurdle rate44, with capital asset pricing model for determination of the cost of equi-
ty.45 As this paper concentrates on behavioral aspects of capital budgeting, it is limited to an 
overview of the instruments in table 2.  
Instrument /  
method Description / use Advantages Disadvantages 
Net present value 
(NPV) 
Sum of discounted cash flows minus 
the initial investment. 
Based on profitability, time 
value of money and cash flow 
measures 
Uncertainty / bias in predictions of 
cash flows and discount rate; no 
rigorous consideration of risk and 
return volatilities  
Internal rate of 
return (IRR) 
The discount rate that makes the net 
present value of the project equal to 
zero: IRR > required rate of return: 
invest 
Based on profitability, time 
value of money and cash flows; 
rather easily understandable 
Uncertainty / bias in predictions of 
cash flows and discount rate; no 
rigorous consideration of risk and 
return volatilities 
Payback method 
Time until recovery of investment: 
amount invested divided by expected 
annual cash flow; the shorter the better 
Ease to calculate and under-
stand; based on cash flows; 
acknowledges risk (the shorter 
the payback, the lower the risk) 
Ignores the time value of money, 
profitability, cash inflows after 
investment recovery 
Weighted average 
cost of capital 
(WACC) 
Blended cost of debt and cost of 
equity set in proportion of the two to 
each other 
Includes cost of all capital, not 
just debt or just equity and 
accounts for the tax shield 
Rather complicated calculation 
Capital asset 
pricing model 
(CAPM) 
Needed for calculation of WACC; 
estimates the cost of equity according 
to market return 
Reflects market value of com-
pany’s common stock 
Errors in estimations of CAPM’s 
components 
Sensitivity  
Analysis 
Calculation of possible misestimated 
cash flows after identification of key 
variables effecting them  
Greater caution due to identifi-
cation of key variables; help in 
detection of inappropriate fore-
casts 
Ambiguous estimations and results; 
underlying variables often inter-
connected; no recognition of real 
options 
Scenario  
Analysis 
A variation of sensitivity analysis with 
a limited number of consistent sets of 
variables 
Easier to forecast values under 
scenario analysis than absolute 
pessimistic / optimistic values 
Ambiguous, subjective estimations 
and results 
Monte Carlo    
Simulation 
A variation of sensitivity analysis 
considering all possible sets of varia-
bles 
Inspection of entire distribution 
of project outcomes 
Ambiguous estimations; difficult to 
explain and calculate; no recogni-
tion of real options 
Real options  /   
decision trees 
Options to modify projects, such as 
expand or abandon a project; calculat-
ed by adding up net present values 
with assigned probabilities  
Flexibility; reduces the escala-
tion of commitment to failing 
projects when used in the selec-
tion phase 
Ambiguous estimations 
Accounting rate 
of return (ARR) 
(annual net cash inflow - annual 
depreciation on asset) / (amount 
invested in asset + residual value)/2 
Ease of calculation and invest-
ment decision (if ARR > require 
rate of return  invest); based 
on profitability 
Uses accounting income measures; 
ignores the time value of money 
 
Profitability index 
Expresses the relative profitability of 
the investment during its entire life 
time; the higher the better, indiffer-
ence at 1; 
Profitability index = NPV/investment 
Help in decision making in 
situations of capital constraint 
Subject to problems in estimation 
of cost of capital and cash flows 
Table 2: Overview of instruments and methods of capital budgeting46 
 
 
                                                 
44  Cf. Bruner, R. et al. (1998), p. 26. 
45  Cf. Gitman, L. / Vandenberg, P. (2000), p. 67; Kalyebara, B. / Ahmed, A. (2011), p. 66. 
46  Source: based on Burns, R. / Walker, J. (2009), pp.83 et sq., Denison, C. (2009), pp.135-150; Brealey, R. / 
Myers, S. / Allen, F. (2011), pp.129-154 and pp. 269- 295. 
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Stage 3: Authorization  
Given capital constraints of companies, at this stage capital rationing and previously defined 
capital budgeting targets eventually decide which projects are realized.47 Therefore, the capi-
tal demand of the proposals is compared with the company’s internal and external sources of 
capital supply such as depreciation reserves and retained earnings, and loans, corporate bonds 
and shares, respectively. The crucial factor here is the cost of capital – e.g., companies cannot 
control their cost of debt because it is influenced by financial market conditions.48 After solv-
ing the question of financing, projects are ranked by e.g. strategic importance, return, and 
risk. A number of risks such as general risks (market risk, inflation, interest rate, foreign ex-
change rate risk etc.) and specific risks i.e. those inherent to a particular project must be as-
sessed. That can be done e.g. by means of sensitivity analysis or a risk map ranking the risks 
by their impact and probability. Then, corresponding risk responses (e.g. risk adjusted dis-
count rate or cash flows) for the setup of a risk management system can be provided. Finally, 
after answering the questions of financing, priorization, and a first implementation plan, pro-
jects perceived as the best are authorized for implementation. 
Stage 4: Implementation  
In the implementation phase, a detailed implementation plan is set up and cascaded down the 
organization since the implementation itself is essentially the task of operations management 
while it is up to senior management to monitor it. This stage can follow the common practice 
of project management. That means, first a work breakdown structure has to be installed. It 
breaks up the project into work packages and individual activities or tasks to be performed. 
Then, for each of the tasks a responsible person as well as time frames and a budget are as-
signed. Finally, milestones, meaning meetings or deadlines until which certain deliverables 
have to be performed, are set.49 Mostly, a project management committee is created in charge 
of planning, implementation, and reporting.50 
Stage 5: Performance measurement and control  
Three kinds of measurement of a project’s performance exist. First, monitoring shortly before 
and after the start of implementation to detect and counteract previously unforeseen problems. 
                                                 
47  Cf. Shimizu, N. / Tamura, A. (2012), p. 46. 
48  Cf. Dean, J. (1951), p. 60.  
49  Cf. PMBok Guide 2008. 
50  Cf. Kalyebara, B. / Ahmed, A. (2011), p. 65. 
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Second, monitoring during the implementation in order to oversee overruns in timing and 
expenditures and to adequately meet problems. And finally, after the completion of the pro-
ject (post-audit), mainly to gather lessons for the coming projects but also, in a limited way, 
to examine the quality of forecasts made by project initiators.51 To audit the results, usually, 
estimates are compared to actual results such as profits, costs (initial expenditure or operating 
cash outflows), volumes, time, or rates of return, respectively.52 
Even though the importance of performance measurement and control may seem obvious, 
surprisingly little is being done in this area. Gordon and Myers found in 1991 that, although 
76% of their survey respondents performed post-audits, those were neither regular, nor risk-
adjusted or thoroughly documented thus not being a standard capital budgeting procedure.53  
  
                                                 
51  Cf. André, J. / Bruggen, A. / Moers, F. (2011), p. 24. 
52  Cf. Kalyebara, B. / Ahmed, A. (2011), p. 67. 
53  Cf. Gordon, L. / Myers, M. (1991), pp. 39-42.  
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2.3 Literature Overview 
In order to perform an integrated analysis, literature from the following fields was analyzed: 
behavioral (corporate) finance, behavioral accounting, and explicitly behavioral aspects in 
capital budgeting. The key insights are shown in table 3. 
Source Insights Research area 
Argyris 
(1953) 
Budgets can have negative impact on human employees which in return negatively 
influences overall work efficiency in the long run.  
Behavioral 
Accounting 
Bart (1988) 
Set up of performance measurement criteria without impact on budgeting slack; reward 
system influences behavior more than oral orders; attitudes of senior managers relate to 
scope of slack and to overall corporate performance. 
Behavioral 
accounting 
Belkaoui 
(1985) 
Negative and inaccurate feedback of self-esteem increases distortion of input infor-
mation and creation of slack. 
Behavioral 
accounting 
Schatzberg /  
Stevens 
(2008) 
Budgetary slack as a form of public opportunism; public and private opportunism can 
improve firm performance; power to reject the budget, permission of slack by higher 
managers and commitment to company produce less slack and higher effort. 
Behavioral 
accounting 
Walker /  
Johnson 
(1999) 
Estimations distortion due to introduction of incentive plan; organizational norms can 
reinforce biases. 
Behavioral 
accounting 
André et al. 
(2011) 
Delegating authority and lower control over a project increases total investment sum, 
especially escalating in the beginning of project implementation. 
Behavioral 
capital 
budgeting 
Bardolet et 
al. (2011) 
Partition dependence bias: companies allocate internal capital toward equality over the 
number of business units of the firm. 
Behavioral 
capital 
budgeting 
Biondi  /  
Marzo 
(2011) 
Analysis of capital budgeting and suggestions of alternatives in cognitive (representa-
tiveness, availability), organizational (optimism, overconfidence, escalation of com-
mitment), and institutional (hurdle rates, payback period, multiple discount rates) di-
mensions. 
Behavioral 
capital 
budgeting 
Denison 
(2009) 
Use of real options in initial project evaluation decreases the escalation of commitment 
to failing projects more than use of net present value alone. This effect is due to the 
consideration of project abandonment already before its authorization and implementa-
tion establishing acceptance of the possibility of project failure from the beginning on. 
Behavioral 
capital 
budgeting 
Gervais 
(2010) 
Seldom and non-qualitative feedback hinders managers to overcome their overconfi-
dence; they tend to overinvest, initiate more mergers, invest in more new products, and 
commit for too long to failing projects; learning, inflated hurdle rates and contractual 
incentives are possible mechanisms to reduce overconfidence. 
Behavioral 
capital 
budgeting 
Malmendier  
/  Tate (2005) 
Measures overconfidence of chief executive officers (CEOs) based on their perception 
by the outsiders: press portrayals and investment decisions (e.g. holding or selling of 
own company's stock). 
Behavioral 
capital 
budgeting 
Pike (1983) 
Capital rationing in large companies is rather a self-imposed constraint than a market-
imposed one; it leads to simple reducing of a number of projects, especially when used 
together with payback period rule, instead of choosing the best projects. 
Behavioral 
capital 
budgeting 
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Shimizu  /  
Tamura 
(2012) 
Comparison of strategic types of firms with their investment decisions. Results: corre-
lation between investment purpose and the degree of project evaluation and post-audit.  
Behavioral 
capital 
budgeting 
Statman  /  
Caldwell 
(1987) 
Commitment can be motivation (higher effort and achievement) and entrapment (fail-
ing projects). Control for entrapment: periodic reviews of milestones by managers; 
project audits by finance staff and outside consultants; takeovers as last resort to termi-
nate projects. 
Behavioral 
capital 
budgeting 
Baker et al. 
(2007) 
Managers are not rational in beliefs and decision making: They overestimate revenues 
and underestimate time and cost. Corporate governance matters. 
Behavioral 
corporate 
finance 
Shefrin 
(2009) 
Behavioral finance transforms finance theory to incorporate more realistic insights 
about managers and investors who are not fully rational and informed. 
Behavioral 
finance 
De Bondt et 
al. (2008) 
Understanding of finance is shifting to incorporation of insights of behavioral finance; 
behavioral finance still lacks a unified theoretic framework. Provide an overview of 
behavioral biases. 
Behavioral 
finance 
Thaler 
(1999) 
Behavioral finance no longer extraordinary; prediction that finance and behavioral 
finance merge since there cannot be non-behavioral finance. 
Behavioral 
finance 
Burns  /  
Walker 
(2009) 
Identification and selection phase most researched; post-audit rare in companies; many 
firms using net present value calculation but also accounting methods extensively. 
Capital 
budgeting 
Ducai (2009) 
Overview of capital budgeting techniques; conclusion: only net present value fully 
accepted by theoreticians but it also has shortcomings such as e.g. investments per-
ceived irreversible and the "now or never" approach (as opposed to real options). 
Capital 
budgeting 
Kalyebara  /  
Ahmed 
(2011) 
Most firms would accept projects with negative net present value and lower than re-
quired rate of return; post-audit phase rather neglected; cash flow estimation is the 
most difficult task in capital budgeting. 
Capital 
budgeting 
Brealey et al. 
(2011) Methods of capital budgeting; agency theory; overview of behavioral finance. 
Corporate 
finance 
Table 3: Overview of examined literature for behavior in budgeting and capital budgeting 
It goes without saying that this subjective selection of articles does not represent the full body 
of literature on the topic. Notably, no articles from psychology or cognitive sciences were 
selected. However, many articles refer heavily to these sources.  
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3 Capital Budgeting Process: Behavioral Implications 
and Success Factors 
3.1 Overview of Behavioral Implications in Capital Budgeting 
The capital budgeting approach has recently been extensively challenged by calls for alterna-
tives incorporating the cognitive, organizational, and institutional dimensions of decision 
making.54 One of the reasons for this is the desire of scholars to elaborate a method of predic-
tion of future cash flows which mirrors the complex adaptive economic world of today better 
as the traditional approach.55  Agency theory can be seen to a certain extent as a predecessor 
of behavioral finance in that it incorporates the egoistic profit seeking behavior of managers. 
Particularly important in the stages of identification and selection is the fact that especially 
the bottom-up originating ideas can be subject to seeking of benefits or a fast career growth. 
Pruitt and Gitman found that 80% of top executives spotted upward biases in revenues fore-
casts and more subtle downward ones in cost forecasts. Two third of them felt the biases were 
introduced either intentionally or through a lack of experience.56 Others studies associated 
such biases with inaccurate information from top management and unintentional and often 
unperceived inadequate managerial behavior57 thus confirming the bounded rationality of the 
neoclassical view itself.58 Furthermore, a growing number of researchers indicate limits of the 
“unconstrained opportunism assumption” of the agency theory: reciprocal behavior and self-
imposed opportunism restraints to achieve fair outcomes.59  
Contrarily to behavioral accounting, where the fear of subjective budget reductions by top 
management during the year creates budgetary slack, in capital budgeting, the same fear 
might create elevated revenue forecasts to bring to the executives’ attention an “even more 
promising project”. A company’s formal and informal performance appraisal schemes com-
bined with the manager’s overconfidence might also lead her to predict elevated profits / short 
                                                 
54  Cf. Gervais, S. (2010); Biondi, Y. / Marzo, G. (2011).  
55  Cf. Mouck, T. (2000). 
56  Cf. Pruitt, S. / Gitman, L. (1987), p. 47. 
57  Cf. Belkaoui, A. (1985); Bart, C. (1988); De Bondt, W. et al. (2008). 
58  Cf. De Bondt, W. et al. (2008), p. 8; Gerling, P. (2007), pp. 81-96. 
59  Cf. Schatzberg, J.W. / Stevens, D. E. (2008), p. 78-80. 
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implementation time, especially easily so with new products. Thereby, the effect will stay the 
same regardless the degree of formality.60 
The by far biggest part of the literature on the topic of behavioral corporate capital budgeting 
inspects the bias of overconfidence and biases related to it in different types and stages of 
projects.61 These will be explored in more detail in chapter 3.2.; chapter 3.3. will shed light 
onto one of the most important and quite widely spread effects: the escalation of commitment 
to failing projects. An overview of behavioral biases is presented in table 4.  
                                                 
60  Cf. Bart, C. (1988), p. 286-288. 
61  Cf. e.g. Malmendier, U. / Tate, G. (2005); Baker, M. / Ruback, R / Wurgler, J. (2007); De Bondt, W. et al. 
(2008); Gervais, S. (2010); Biondi, Y. / Marzo, G. (2011). 
 Reason (bias) Definition Results 
Se
nt
im
en
t  
/  
be
lie
fs
 
Over-
confidence 
Overestimation of own knowledge, 
abilities (e.g. to control risk), pos-
sibilities, precision of information, 
value of own company; 
Underestimation of risk (highest in 
the least equity dependent firms) – 
in capital budgeting, essentially the 
same as optimism. 
• Overinvestment (high degree of influence) due 
to understatement of project cost and time and 
overstatement of revenues 
• More rapid investment of free cash flow 
• More mergers and acquisitions initiations and 
bidding mistakes due to over-evaluations 
• More investment into new projects, products and 
markets 
• Entrepreneurship 
• Preference for internal over external financing 
and for debt over equity 
• Escalation of commitment (i.e. failure to ignore 
sunk cost hence holding on to (overvalued) pro-
jects / stocks / options for too long beyond opti-
mal point of time) 
Optimism 
Belief that favorable future events 
are more likely than they really are 
(highest in the least equity depend-
ent firms) – in capital budgeting, 
essentially the same as overconfi-
dence. 
• Overinvestment (marginal degree of influence) 
• Self-fulfilling prophecy: dedication to making 
the project meet expectations which gets manag-
er closer to these expectations even if they do 
not meet them 
Pessimism  /  
low self-esteem 
Belief that favorable future events 
are less likely than they really are;  
Underestimation of matters per-
ceived as positive and overestima-
tion of unfavorable events. 
• Increased risk aversion 
• Negatively distorted forecasts (sales too low, 
costs too high etc.) 
• Underinvestment 
Anchoring 
Belief relying on one (first) piece 
of information without adjustment 
afterwards. 
• Decision making based on partially / wholly 
wrong information 
Represen-
tativeness 
Overreliance on stereotypes and  /  
or recent time-series or events. 
• Decision making based on partially / wholly 
wrong information 
Availability 
bias 
Overweighting of easily accessible 
information. 
• Decision making based on partially / wholly 
wrong information 
Capital Budgeting Process: Behavioral Implications and Success Factors 
15 
 
Table 4: Overview of biases in behavioral corporate capital budgeting62 
3.2 The Bias of Overconfidence and Related Biases 
Overconfidence is defined as the overestimation of own knowledge, abilities (e.g. to control 
risk), possibilities, precision of information and value of own company as well as the underes-
timation of risk.63 It occurs more often before the implementation of the project, thus in the 
stages of identification / filtering, selection, and, partially, authorization.64 Especially with 
projects financed from free cash flow, overconfident managers are found to overinvest due to 
                                                 
62  Source: based on Statman, M. / Caldwell, D. (1987), p. 11; De Bondt, W. et al. (2008), pp. 11 et sq,.; Ger-
vais, S. (2010), p.7, p. 11 and p. 18; Bardolet, D. / Fox, C. / Lovall, D. (2011), p. 1475; Brealey, R. / Myers, 
S. / Allen, F. (2011), pp. 340-368. 
63  Cf. De Bondt, W. et al. (2008), p. 8. 
64  For measures of overconfidence cf. Malmendier, U. / Tate, G (2005), especially pp. 652 et sq.; Gervais, S. 
(2010), especially p. 10. 
Self-attribution 
/  self-serving 
bias 
Attributing success to own skills, 
while blaming negative outcomes 
on outside sources / effects. 
• Disabling oneself from learning from past events 
 Bounded   
rationality 
Selective intake and processing of 
information influenced by personal 
characteristics. 
• Decision making based on partially / wholly 
incorrectly processed information 
Be
ha
vi
or
al
 p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 
Loss aversion 
Reluctance to realize losses 
(weighting losses about twice as 
much as gains of similar magni-
tude).  
• Inconsistency towards risk: avoid risk to protect 
wealth but assume risk to avoid losses 
• Procrastination to postpone the pain from the 
loss 
Risk aversion Unwillingness to engage in risky or uncertain situations 
• Missing profitable investment opportunities 
• Saving behavior instead of investment behavior 
Mental ac-
counting /  
 (narrow) fra-
ming (prospect 
theory) 
Categorization and valuing of fi-
nancial outcomes 
• Ignorance of sunk cost 
• Tendency to treat a new risk separately from 
existing ones 
• Three mental incomes: current income, current 
wealth, future income 
Myopic loss 
aversion 
Combines time horizon based 
framing and loss aversion 
• The shorter the time horizon, the higher the 
aversion to risk 
Self-control Control of own impulses  
• Saving behavior 
• Escalation of commitment 
• Procrastination when failing self-control and 
thus, reluctance to loss realization 
Regret aversion Assuming a possible ex-post regret of wrong investment  
• Escalation of commitment 
• “Betting” on good assets (“herding behavior”) 
• Procrastination and reluctance to loss realization  
Partition    
dependence 
Allocating available corporate 
funds rather equally over the busi-
ness of the firm 
• Escalation of commitment  
• Subsidizing poorly performing or non-profitable 
divisions 
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overestimation of cash inflows and underestimation of project time and cost.65 Furthermore, 
they tend to engage more in mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliances than more ration-
al managers. The managers especially do so if they feel that their firm has benefited from 
such, or their, actions in recent past, thus being victim of the representativeness (reliance on 
recent information) and self-attribution biases (attributing successes to self while blaming 
failures on circumstances).66 Meanwhile, there is robust data indicating that acquisitions tend 
to diminish the value of the acquiring firm, at least as measured by the share price.67 Since 
capital budgeting occurs infrequently, rare and often non-qualitative feedback reinforces the 
attribution bias preventing managers from learning from their mistakes.68 
Perceiving their company as undervalued, overconfident CEOs seldom issue equity thus con-
tributing to a less costly financing.69 This has also been found to be the main reason for capi-
tal rationing.70 Also, Gervais71 and Brealey et al.72 suggest overconfidence to contribute posi-
tively to internal company processes through raised “effort, commitment, and persistence” 
which goes with the self-fulfilling prophecy, the fact that overconfidence motivates to work 
harder leading to achievement of goals which would otherwise have not been achieved, cf. 
table 4. 
Overconfidence might be higher in the beginning stages but it certainly influences the whole 
capital budgeting process. Moreover, it is interrelated with many other biases whereby they 
often reinforce each other mutually. Mirroring it, pessimism, low self-esteem or negative 
self-esteem feedback might induce overestimation of cost and underestimation of sales, pos-
sibly through increased risk aversion, leading to underinvestment and missing of opportuni-
ties.73 That points to the importance of adequate performance appraisal towards colleagues 
and subordinates.  
Following Gervais’ call for more research on the correlation between managerial traits and 
companies’ investment policies,74 Shimizu and Tamura75 conducted an analysis and found the 
                                                 
65  Cf. Baker, M. / Ruback, R / Wurgler, J. (2007); Gervais, S. (2010). 
66  Cf. De Bondt, W. et al. (2008), p. 11. 
67  Cf. Gervais, S. (2010), pp.12 et sq. 
68  Cf. Gervais, S. (2010), pp. 20 et sq. 
69  Cf. Heaton, J. (2002), p. 38. 
70  Cf. Mukherjee, T. / Hingorani, V. (1999), p. 14. 
71  Cf. Gervais, S. (2010), p. 24. 
72  Cf. Brealey, R. / Myers, S. / Allen, F. (2011), p. 270. 
73  Cf. Belkaoui, A. (1985), p. 120. 
74  Cf. Gervais, S. (2010), p. 24. 
75  Cf. Shimizu, N. / Tamura, A. (2012). 
Capital Budgeting Process: Behavioral Implications and Success Factors 
17 
 
following: (1) Companies investing primarily to produce new products and to enter new mar-
kets tend to not perform thorough post-audits; (2) Those companies investing primarily to 
improve their cost competitiveness undertake a profitability check after the implementation; 
(3) Companies not strongly practicing capital investment due to their prudence tend to have 
continuous evaluation.76 Not surprisingly, heavily investing companies (1) earn the highest 
returns, followed by those with continuous evaluation (3) and those primarily re-
investing (2).77 Since managing new markets and products is a lot riskier than reinvestment, 
the findings are consistent with Gervais in that overconfident managers are more likely to 
experience outstanding successes, e.g. with innovative products, but that they also are more 
likely to suffer great failures,78 one reason for which can also be the lack of learning effects 
due to the absence of proper post-auditing. 
Communicated importance of fast payback or quick returns corresponds to the availability 
bias when easily accessible or imaginable information is treated as too important.79 Thus, it 
induces the proposal of fast payback projects which often are too risky, have a negative net 
present value, or are put forward on the expense of other, more long-term projects with higher 
net present value.80 As a company will maximize its value by taking only projects with posi-
tive net present value, top management needs to ensure that only such investments are being 
proposed. However, also the upper echelons can be biased or behave intentionally incorrect. 
Arriving at the stage of authorization, an investment proposal already has been formed and 
ideally, thoroughly thought through. However, this also suggests an accumulation of biases 
occurred in previous stages (unless they are eliminated). Here, biases concerning the capital 
rationing and risk assessment are the most pronounced ones. 
The bias of overconfidence can occur again at this stage. Since overconfident managers per-
ceive their company as undervalued, they are hesitant in issuing equity. Thus, they tend to 
finance their projects from internal equity reserves which in turn can be the reason for the 
rationing of capital. Another effect of overconfidence is that in many projects, the risks tend 
to be understated.81 Moreover, the degree of everyone’s personal risk-seeking or risk-aversion 
differs thus influencing the perception of a risk’s impact and probability crucial for assess-
                                                 
76  Cf. Shimizu, N. / Tamura, A. (2012), pp. 51-54. 
77  Cf. Shimizu, N. / Tamura, A. (2012), p. 55. 
78  Cf. Gervais, S. (2010), pp. 16-17. 
79  Cf. De Bondt, W. et al. (2008), p. 11. 
80  Cf. Brealey, R. / Myers, S. / Allen, F. (2011), p. 270. 
81  Cf. Brealey, R. / Myers, S. / Allen, F. (2011), p. 270. 
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ment and anticipation of risks and creation of risk responses. Nevertheless, many managers 
were found to be risk averse. They applied capital rationing to be able to reject projects they 
perceived as too risky.82 Furthermore, Bardolet et al. found that within a company, allocation 
of capital (e.g. to projects from different divisions) is subject to partition dependence, that is, 
that the “allocations are biased toward equality over the business units” of a company83 which 
can arguably subsidize unprofitable divisions.  
The strategic importance and thus, ranking of projects can similarly be affected by personal 
preferences leading to possible distortion or the authorization of a set of projects which is less 
profitable than another possible set of projects would have been. 
3.3 The Effect of Escalation of Commitment to Failing Projects  
Another costly failure of managers widely examined is the escalation of commitment i.e. 
holding on to not profitable projects for too long, observable in the implementation and con-
trol stages. Statman and Caldwell showed that mental accounting / framing84 and loss and 
regret aversions are important reasons for “throwing good money after bad” to save poorly 
performing projects. Mental accounting or framing means that managers do not treat sunk 
cost as sunk but want, in their mental accounts, to offset them by project revenues so that they 
can “close” the account at least at zero, and not at a loss, to not be disappointed.85 Loss aver-
sion is the unwillingness to realize losses while regret aversion is an ex-ante assumption of a 
possible ex-post regret of a wrong investment.86 In other words, individuals do not want to 
make decisions by the outcomes of which they might be disappointed in the future. Thus, they 
try to “even out” losses by further investing in the project. The two latter are closely interre-
lated reinforcing the former.  
The escalation of commitment strongly contradicts the rule that all selection, continuation, 
and termination decisions must be based on the project’s net present value. Furthermore, in-
vestors’ positive reactions to announcements of cancellations of bad projects87 must be anoth-
er hint to managers to quit rather earlier than later. 
                                                 
82  Cf. Mukherjee, T. / Hingorani, V. (1999).  
83  Cf. Bardolet, D. / Fox, C. / Lovall, D. (2011), p. 1476.  
84  Cf. Fennema, M. / Perkins, J. (2007), p. 226. 
85  Cf. Statman, M. / Caldwell, D. (1987), p. 8. 
86  Cf. De Bondt, W. et al. (2008), pp. 11 et sq. 
87  Cf. Statman, M. / Caldwell, D. (1987), p. 8. 
Capital Budgeting Process: Behavioral Implications and Success Factors 
19 
 
More often than not, escalation of commitment leads to even higher losses as managers turn 
less risk averse in order to save the project in turn becoming more optimistic than they should. 
This leads them to act highly irrationally initiating further expenditures on the failing project. 
One could argue that overconfidence reinforces the regret and loss aversions thus contributing 
to the escalation of commitment. The partition dependence can produce another form of it – 
commitment to badly performing divisions instead of their liquidation. 
Yet again, commitment has other, positive, effects such as motivation to work more thus 
achieving more than would have been achieved otherwise (cf. self-fulfilling prophecy and 
overconfidence, table 4). Thus, commitment can motivate but also entrap managers into irra-
tional pursuit of loss-making projects.88 Correlated with it is the disposition effect by Shefrin 
and Statman whereby investors tend to sell winning stocks too early while holding the falling 
ones for too long.89  
To conclude, table 5 shows examined biases according to capital budgeting process stages.90  
                                        Stage         
 
  Bias / (effect)  
Identification Selection Authorization Implementation Control 
Availability bias       
Overconfidence          
Representativeness bias          
Self-attribution         
Pessimism  /  low self-esteem        
Agency problem /  egoism        
Risk aversion          
Regret aversion          
Loss aversion         
Mental accounting /  framing        
(Escalation of commitment)        
Table 5: Stages of capital budgeting process and their behavioral implications 
It is debatable how far one can go in transferring the behavioral insights of budgeting on capi-
tal budgeting. One can imagine that e.g. a certain acceptance of over- or underestimations can 
result in smaller extent of wrong estimation and even in a higher performance, as it was found 
                                                 
88  Cf. Statman, M. / Caldwell, D. (1987), p. 11. 
89  Cf. Shefrin, H. / Statman, M. (1985). 
90  Cf. Gerling, P. (2007), p. 109 for a table showing biases along the stages of the problem solving cycle. 
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to be with budgetary slack.91 Nevertheless, in practice of capital budgeting it would probably 
lead to more (over-)confidence with its implications discussed above. On the contrary, the 
feeling of being trusted by top management is likely to lead to motivating commitment. Also, 
top management might rather accept the optimistic assumptions of proposers if they suggest 
them within strategically important areas.92 
                                                 
91  Cf. Bart, C. (1988), p. 289. 
92  Cf. Bart, C. (1988), p. 286. 
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4 Discussion, Recommendations, and Critical Assess-
ment 
4.1 Discussion: Behavioral Success Factors of the Stages of Capi-
tal Budgeting Process 
The overall goal of the capital budgeting process is the best possible decision making in order 
to realize investments increasing the value of the company. Critical success factors when ex-
istent prevent the failure of the capital budgeting process (and, possibly, the company with it). 
When a company neglects to establish one of them, it might result in a malfunctioning capital 
budgeting process, possibly leading to problems on the corporate level in case the investment 
in question is large enough.  
The aforementioned negative behavioral implications are the starting point of the identifica-
tion of behavioral success factors. Consequently, following condensed three success factors 
diminishing the negative impacts of aforementioned behavioral biases can be identified:  
• Reflective Prudence  
• Critical Communication 
• Outcome Independence  
 
4.2 Reflective Prudence 
Reflective or self-reflective prudence in capital budgeting means on the one hand to be aware 
of the classical decision biases everyone is subject to and, on the other, to diligently generate 
the data needed for the decision making. This reflective prudence should best be institutional-
ized and framed into a standard procedure.  
Dealing with predictions of future cash flows of projects is not an exact science. The trans-
formation of lofty visions and ambitious plans under uncertainty into cash in- and outflows 
with a defined risk profile remains the Achilles’ heel of every capital budgeting project, since 
it is filtered through the above mentioned biases. Being aware of the different subjective bias 
traps provides a certain level of self-critical reflection which in the end might lead to more 
Discussion, Recommendations, and Critical Assessment 
22 
 
reasonable projections. Some managers might even improve their decision making skills by 
the creation of awareness for psychological biases alone.93 
It is advisable to perform special training with investment project participants to partially 
remedy the cognitive biases and develop good meta-knowledge, which is according to Russo 
and Schoemaker a “teachable and learnable” skill.94 Fennema and Perkins found that factors 
such as training and experience positively influence managers in their investment decisions 
which involve sunk cost considerations. Training meant in that case a sufficient amount of 
managerial accounting courses while experience was adequate professional experience in 
working with investment projects involving sunk cost principles.95 Fennema and Perkins sug-
gest that individuals with either one or both preconditions are more likely to make investment 
decisions leading to satisfactory financial results.  
 Reflective Prudence also manifests itself in a diligent data gathering and assumption clar-
ification phase. Gathering, filtering, analyzing, and applying adequate information for deci-
sion making is crucial. In capital budgeting process, it is imperative in the stages of identifica-
tion and especially selection of investment proposals. This should include sensitivity analysis, 
break-even calculations, risk mapping and scenario development.96 This phase should not be 
regarded as a way to generate an objective truth about the future, but merely to avoid various 
personal biases. For instance, the estimation of cash flows is perceived to be the most difficult 
task in the capital budgeting process.97 Thus, Reflective Prudence counteracts the availability 
and representativeness bias during identification and assessment of investment proposals. 
Moreover, it has an effect during implementation and controlling of investments. Clear in-
structions and standard operating procedures represent institutionalized meta-knowledge.  
Finally, Reflective Prudence institutionalizes areas of self-reflection within the capital 
budgeting process: A critical self-assessment with a standard set of questions such as ‘What 
are reasons that my assumptions might prove incorrect? Which are potential roadblocks? 
What are scenarios, in which the prospective project will not work out?’ might be a produc-
tive way to enhance the personal bias management. The potential list of cognitive control 
                                                 
93  Cf. Russo, E. / Schoemaker, P. (1992), p. 13. 
94  Cf. Russo, E. / Schoemaker, P. (1992), pp. 10 et sq. 
95  Cf. Fennema, M. / Perkins, J. (2008). 
96  Cf. Burns, R. / Walker, J., (2009), pp. 83-85. 
97  Cf. Kalyebara, B. /  Ahmed, A. (2011), p. 67. 
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techniques for the overconfidence has been explored before by Russo and Schoemaker.98 Fur-
thermore, e.g. through the instrument of feedback, overconfidence and self-attribution could 
be lowered leading to less biased decision making for future projects bringing reflective pru-
dence to the control stage as well. 
4.3 Critical Communication 
Communication is a multidimensional phenomenon. It should start with training about the 
investment process and meta-knowledge about classical decision biases. Since objectivity is 
hardly to achieve, inter-subjective story development becomes key. The danger of closed 
loops and groupthink might trade individual biases with even more dangerous group biases.99 
Even emotional group dynamics might negatively affect capital-budgeting decisions.100 
The critical communication about the potential investment project should include extensive 
and comprehensive communication in form of standardized reports and review and feedback-
meetings. The communication of the potential pitfalls and risks involved and a reflected 
statement about the self-assessment of cognitive biases would most certainly enrich the pro-
ject selection and decision process. The simple comparison of NPVs does, from a behavioral 
perspective, not suffice to decide on an investment project. Critical Communication provides 
transparency about the actions of the project co-workers and the reasons for them. Top man-
agement should refrain from communicating hurdle rates or short payback periods even 
though it is found to be common in striving to reduce overconfidence.101 Brealey and Myers’ 
suggest that elevating hurdle rates will neither diminish the number of proposals nor correct 
for biases, but encourage project proposers to “sell” their ideas over-enthusiastically.102 In-
stead, senior managers should ask the proposers for justification of their proposals, i.e. expla-
nation of their judgment through thorough calculation as well as literal description since this 
practice has been found to make decision makers and proposers more self-critical about their 
judgment process and, as a result, to lead to more adequate and less biased decision mak-
ing.103 It endorses individuals’ orientation and understanding of processes thus contributing to 
efficient processes. Encouraging, feedback and appropriate performance measurement and 
                                                 
98  Cf. Russo, E. / Schoemaker, P. (1992), pp. 12-14.  
99  Cf. Eisenhardt, K. / Kahwajy, J. / Bourgeois, L. (1997); Horton, T. (2002). 
100  Cf. Kida, T. / Moreno, K. / Smith, J. (2001), p. 480. 
101  Cf. Pruitt, S. / Gitman, L. (1987); Gervais, S. (2010). 
102  Cf. Brealey, R. / Myers, S. / Allen, F. (2011), p. 270. 
103  Cf. Fennema, M. / Perkins, J. (2008), p. 232. 
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compensation schemes should be installed. The system has to reward only the behavior bene-
fiting the company and be best oriented on net present value instead of book values as well as 
some non-financial indicators such as personal development and training of assistants.104 
Thus, a reward system should first and foremost reward the provision of correct information 
by the manager, and reward its early disclosure over a late one. Furthermore, while negative 
feedback can also be motivating, one has to use it with great caution as e.g. negative feedback 
on self-esteem was found to distort the assumptions and estimates of the concerned person.105 
Feedback must be performed on a regular basis, also anonymously by means of software thus 
increasing the honesty, especially from subordinates towards superiors.  
4.4 Outcome Independence 
The best way to avoid individual and group biases is to integrate independent views into the 
project assessment and decision team. A rather large heterogeneous group would probably 
provide more safeguard against biases. However, processes of such a team might be not as 
efficient as those of a small homogeneous group. Hence, personal, cultural, and professional 
backgrounds of the members must be considered. Besides, team members’ and designated 
project managers’ overconfidence can be measured based e.g. on Malmendier and Tate.106 
Consequently, the right mix of (behavioral) competencies for the implementation and super-
vision of the project can be provided. Internal or external auditors might for example enrich 
the team. Due to their business focus on fraud and errors, they tend to have a rather conserva-
tive judgment.107 A special committee in charge of assumption evaluation and feasibility 
analysis of investment proposals including finance or managerial accountant staff might en-
hance transparency and provide another layer of rationality and objectivity correcting for pro-
posers’ overconfidence biases.  
Furthermore, it is advisable to agree on a set of goals to be reached within e.g. the next six 
months. Both behavioral finance and behavioral accounting scholars agree on the controlla-
bility principle: managers should not be held answerable for performance that is subject to 
factors outside of their control.108 Statman and Caldwell empirically found that escalation of 
                                                 
104  Cf. Bart, C. (1988), p. 290. 
105  Cf. Belkaoui, A. (1985), p. 120. 
106  Cf. Malmendier, U. / Tate, G. (2005). 
107  Cf. Russo, E. / Schoemaker, P. (1992), p. 10. 
108  Cf. Bart, C. (1988); Atkinson, A. et al. (1997).  
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commitment is less expressed when the subjects do not feel anxious due to the possibility of 
punishment by upper management for inappropriate performance of the project.109 
Escalation of commitment is the main danger when implementing investment projects since it 
aggravates the failure of a project thus possibly threatening the very existence of the compa-
ny. Real options are found to provide better decision making than net present value alone due 
to increased flexibility and quality of information.110 Furthermore, they are found to decrease 
the escalation of commitment111 since managers are confronted with the abandonment option 
already in the selection stage. Thus, real options should become an integral part of the capital 
budgeting process. 
A problem of self-control explains aversion to termination of failing endeavors. And even 
though rules are a good means of counteraction, since their implementation or obedience 
would again fall to the biased manager, distinct organizational structures are needed to fight 
overinvestment and escalation of commitment.112 Such structures can be benchmarks of loss-
es that trigger the termination nearly automatically. One benchmark can be present termina-
tion value equal to sunk cost. Mentally, the account then closes at zero without loss making it 
easier for the concerned person to cope with. For assessment of the present termination value 
regular net present value reconsiderations must be introduced by not personally responsible 
personnel,113 e.g. from internal auditing department. Financial manager should be empowered 
to enforce project termination by the project manager.  
Moreover, emphasizing the gains from termination over its losses might as well help in ter-
mination. And finally, providing information on mental accounting and differences between 
commitment and entrapment to the staff will make them more rational in their decisions due 
to the awareness to own biases. 
Not enough attention is being paid to project evaluation altogether, especially to post-
audit.114 Thus, the first recommendation here is to actually make it a standard behavior. The 
control stage is about gathering, analyzing, and providing objective information for “poten-
                                                 
109  Cf. Statman, M. / Caldwell, D. (1987), p. 13. 
110  Cf. Denison, C. (2009), p. 134. 
111  Cf. Denison, C. (2009), p. 148. 
112  Cf. Statman, M. / Caldwell, D. (1987), pp. 11-14. 
113  Cf. Statman, M. / Caldwell, D. (1987), p. 10. 
114  Cf. Statman, M. / Caldwell, D. (1987), p. 14; Burns, R. / Walker, J. (2009), p. 86; Denison, C. (2009), p. 149; 
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tially unpopular decisions” now and in the future.115 Hence, information support systems 
must be established. However, not only information technology, but also interpersonal com-
munication is helpful. Personal, formal and informal meetings between project manager and 
financial controller are advisable for their general understanding. Nevertheless, the controller 
has to retain her neutrality. Furthermore, the threat of detection of deliberate capital budgeting 
slacks in the post-audit phase can reduce them.116 
Overall, adequate corporate culture could provide consistency which is found to be socially 
desirable.117 Trust, collaboration, feedback and “intrapreneurship” should be encouraged. On 
the other side, irrational managers can only impact an organization with weak corporate gov-
ernance.118 The establishment of strong corporate governance is thus important at all process 
stages. However, it is especially important in the authorization stage to provide transparency 
and to enforce reflective prudence and critical communication.  
4.5 Critical Assessment and Limitations 
Even if the principles of capital budgeting investment are the same worldwide, the behavior 
of individuals conducting it is altered by their background, and so are their assumptions and 
estimates. Most empirical evidence on behavior in capital budgeting comes from Anglo-
Saxon or western countries. Thus, it is itself subject to cultural biases because the respondents 
have a very similar cultural background. For example, risk-aversion is treated in finance as a 
rational feature. However, the degree of risk-aversion varies highly between nations. Fur-
thermore, the influences of gender and professional background are neither treated in the lit-
erature. Also, these traits as well as neutrality of the researchers can generally be questioned 
as well.  
The mostly used techniques of capital budgeting are not flawless, they all have their limita-
tions. E.g. With the net present value, the investments are considered irreversible and the ap-
proach is “now or never”.119 The use of and research on real options is very limited120. 
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Furthermore, the research concentrates mostly on large listed companies (Australian Securi-
ties Exchange Index 500, Fortune 500 and 1000 etc.) thus excluding the small and medium-
sized enterprises and in so doing, biasing the research for the component of corporate size and 
culture of large companies. Additionally, the specific limitations of this paper are the absence 
of an empirical part and the exclusive use of English literature. Moreover, due to limits of this 
paper and the concentration on the topic of capital budgeting, the corresponding areas of be-
havioral accounting and behavioral finance could not be treated in depth thus possibly unin-
tentionally missing some minor factors. 
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5 Conclusion and Outlook  
The presented paper strives to provide capital budgeting practitioners with behavioral success 
factors and recommendations for the stages of capital budgeting process. Therefore, in chap-
ter 2, the term capital budgeting was defined and the different stages of the capital budgeting 
process were identified, namely identification, selection, authorization, implementation, and 
control; the underlying areas of behavioral finance and behavioral accounting were contrast-
ed, and finally, an overview of the surveyed literature was provided. Chapter 3 discussed the 
behavioral implications on capital budgeting such as the reasons for overinvestment and esca-
lation of commitment to failing projects. Subsequently, the behavioral success factors for the 
previously identified stages were isolated, that is, motivation, objectivity, rationality, pru-
dence, information, and transparency. Chapter 4 discussed the key success factors reflective 
prudence, critical communication and outcome independence and provided practical recom-
mendations for capital budgeting practitioners. It ends with a discussion of the limitations of 
the article.  
In 1999, Thaler argued that in the near future, finance and behavioral finance will have 
merged into one respected domain since there cannot be “non-behavioral” finance.121 Howev-
er, ten years later, even though behavioral finance is not as disputed, it still lacks a generally 
recognized definition, a unified framework and a theoretical core.122 This presents a wide-
ranging ground for exploration efforts. Lingnau and Gerling provided in 2004 and 2007, re-
spectively, first bridges from the international managerial and cognition theory and cognitive 
psychology to the German management accounting (“Controlling”) discussion.123 Interna-
tionally “neuro-accounting” academics have formed a niche group, so far, waiting for a bigger 
share of attention.124 This interdisciplinary field apparently offers further research potential.        
Behavior in capital budgeting is a relatively new area hence offering a broad field of research. 
Possible streams of investigation can be empirical studies of influences on capital budgeting 
processes by factors such as culture (on a broad international scale), size of the company (e.g. 
survey of small and medium-sized enterprises), and gender (contrasting implications of gen-
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der-biased behavior such as e.g. degrees of overconfidence). Also, studies on the subject per-
formed within companies might provide results well mirroring the corporate reality. Moreo-
ver, further investigations on biases which have not yet received considerable attention such 
as representativeness, availability, anchoring, narrow framing,125 managerial traits126 and real 
options or opportunity cost in case of project cancelation could be undertaken.  
Any capital-budgeting process deals with the construction of future scenarios under uncertain-
ty and assessment of potential success and failure of future projects. The defined (or any oth-
er) success factors cannot guarantee successful investment projects. However, the practical 
recommendations to implement the principles of reflective prudence, critical communication 
and outcome independence could diminish the effect of cognitive and emotional biases and 
thus address a root cause of wrong investment decisions.  
Integrating the views of the managerial and organizational cognition theory and findings of 
cognitive psychology should further contribute to theory building and empirical insights for a 
successful business practice.127 
 
 
  
                                                 
125  Cf. Baker, M. / Ruback, R. / Wurgler, J. (2007). 
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